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S
outh Korean society is in the throes of demo-
graphic and socio-political change, which 
will challenge the adaptability and resilience 
of its young democracy. The growing influx of im-
migrants into the Republic of Korea (ROK) cre-
ates a unique opportunity for the South Korean 
society to deepen the meaning and practice of 
democracy through the social and political inte-
gration of these “New Koreans.” Although official 
recognition of these newcomers includes rights 
to citizenship under specific circumstances and 
substantial support for acculturation programs, 
discrimination by the larger society, economic 
insecurity, and sociocultural marginalization sur-
round their daily lives. The ROK is in a transition-
al moment from what Anthony Smith describes as 
the “ethnic-genealogical” model of national iden-
tity to the “civic-territorial” model.1
This paper addresses the political implications 
of a South Korea that is increasingly constituted 
by ethnically different individuals from multiple 
countries who speak different languages and prac-
tice unfamiliar customs. It emphasizes that South 
Korean democracy, born of relative homogeneity 
in the late 20th century, will have to accommodate 
growing heterogeneity in the 21st century. Accom-
modation includes political representation of the 
New Koreans in government, elected office, civil 
society organizations, in addition to educational 
access and re-education of the Korean public re-
garding national identity and interests. The paper 
also discusses how demographic heterogeneity 
can change foreign relations as newcomers medi-
ate economic, diplomatic, and people-to-people 
ties with their countries and cultures of origin. 
Additionally, the increasing presence of different 
and mixed ethnicities invites examination of the 
long-held basis of peninsular unification, namely, 
“pure bloodline,” and the exploration of an alter-
native civic and democratic rationale for unifica-
tion to match the demographic dynamism.
South Korea’s  
Demographic Changes and  
their Political Impact
1  Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (New York: Wiley, 1991) and National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991). Ethno-symbolic 
aspects of nation-hood, including cultural and aesthetic expressions of collective life, are explored in Athena Leoussi and Steven Grosby, eds., 
Nationalism and Ethnosymbolism: History, Culture and Ethnicity in the Formation of Nations (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2006).
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Policy Implications
The presence of New Koreans means the rise of 
new political voices that demand attention and in-
fluence in Korean politics. The acculturation pro-
cess necessitates an expansion of political space by 
the majority South Korean population so that the 
newcomers can exercise the rights and responsi-
bilities of political participation and avoid the ac-
cumulation of grievances against the majority. 
Deepening democracy in this context requires 
policy adaptation in the legal system (pertaining 
to immigration, family law, criminal jurisdiction 
and adjudication, legal redress for foreign nation-
als who are victims of violence, etc.), improved 
oversight and coordination among government 
ministries and between the central government 
and local governments, changes in political in-
stitutions (developing mechanisms for political 
representation of New Koreans, civil society re-
sponsiveness), and national education about de-
mographic changes and democracy. 
In a society whose denizens are of diverse national 
and cultural origins, foreign policy diversification 
is inevitable. Immigrants are and will be creating 
new economic, diplomatic, and people-to-people 
ties between the ROK and their respective native 
countries. How New Koreans might shape the for-
eign policy and security interests of the ROK is an 
important question. 
New Koreans do not share with the majority of 
South Koreans the history and psychological lega-
cy of the Korean War and over a half century-old 
commitment to the U.S.-ROK alliance. Will the 
alliance and the bilateral relationship with the 
United States be more or less of a priority in the 
future? Given that Chinese citizens are the largest 
group of marriage migrants in South Korea, might 
they and their offspring facilitate friendlier ties 
with Chinese and China? What kinds of regional 
geopolitical and economic changes might emerge 
from the demographic changes inside the ROK? 
Concerning unification, the growing number of of-
ficially recognized multicultural denizens prompts 
a renegotiation of the foundational basis and future 
goals of unification within the ROK from an em-
phasis on ethnonational unification to a unification 
based on pluralism and acceptance of sociopolitical 
heterogeneity. Inducing North Koreans to accept 
non-ethnic Koreans as integral members of a Kore-
an polity will be a significant challenge.
Lastly, the U.S. and other stakeholders of democ-
racy and pluralism should fashion policies toward 
the ROK that support political and cultural plu-
ralism and advance the deepening of democracy.
Overview of Migration
Since the 1990s, the Republic of Korea (ROK) has 
hosted tens of thousands of foreign nationals in 
any given year. As of March, 2015, the ROK gov-
ernment recorded 1,813,037 foreign-born persons 
residing in Korea, including students, white collar 
workers, migrant workers in low-end industries 
and service jobs, undocumented workers, and 
“foreign brides.”2 In 2014, documented (legal) 
workers totaled 503,135 and together with an es-
timated 64,507 undocumented workers comprise 
laborers in primarily 3D industries (dirty, danger-
ous, difficult) and low-end service sectors.
Currently, more than three out of one hundred 
residents in Korea hail from foreign countries, 
2  Republic of Korea, Ministry of Justice, Korea Immigration Service, March 2015 Monthly Report on Immigration Service and Foreigner Policy  
[출입국·외국인정책통계월보 2015년 3월호], (Seoul: Government of the Republic of Korea, 2015), 1.
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a spectacular demographic change from 1990, 
when less than 50,000 foreigners, comprising 0.1 
percent of the nation’s population lived in Korea.3 
By 2020, they are expected to constitute about five 
percent of the total population and 10 percent by 
2030, a level comparable to the proportion of im-
migrants and multi-ethnic populations in some 
European societies today.  
The first significant wave of in-migration involved 
workers from poor countries, predominantly from 
Asia, who were invited by the ROK government 
through the Industrial Trainee System in the ear-
ly 1990s. The second wave resulted from the ROK 
Employment Permit System (2004), which granted 
worker status to foreigners from fifteen Southeast 
and Central Asian countries with specific visa al-
lotments for each country and type of job agreed 
upon in bilateral Memorandum of Agreements. 
The ROK government’s EPS website states that the 
permits “[a]llow employers to hire foreign workers 
in the labor shortage industries such as agriculture 
& stockbreeding, fishery, construction, and man-
ufacturing with less than 300 regular workers.”4 
The EPS allows for a maximum three-year term 
of employment with the possibility of a one-time 
extension of two years (at the employer’s request) 
and entitles the workers to protection under Kore-
an labor laws and Industrial Accident Compensa-
tion Insurance.5 The aim was to regularize foreign 
workers by lowering their inclination to leave their 
designated workplaces in search of greater mobili-
ty and pay (thereby increasing the pool of undocu-
mented workers). This had been a serious problem 
for the Korean government and employers un-
der the trainee system. As in other countries, the 
undocumented (“illegal”) worker population per-
sists, as a result of overstaying tourist or student 
visas or as a consequence of quitting the designat-
ed place of employment without authorization. 
The third wave involves mostly women who for-
mally immigrate to Korea as wives and build fami-
lies with the Korean men they marry. Korean men 
who are agricultural workers, part of the urban 
poor, or lower-middle class bachelors or divorcés 
have a hard time finding Korean women to marry 
and therefore engage match-making agencies or 
“brokers” to find a spouse. The men tend to be sig-
nificantly older than the women, and the couples 
usually cannot communicate in a common lan-
guage and have little or no understanding of each 
other’s personalities of living conditions. China is 
the largest sending country, followed by Vietnam; 
women also come from the Philippines, Mongo-
lia, Thailand, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and some 
Eastern European countries. Today, there are over 
820,000 people belonging to a multicultural fami-
ly in Korea, a figure which has more than doubled 
over the past eight years.6 
Marriage migration has been facilitated by the 
central and local governments. It is one of the 
very few immigration categories that promises an 
expedited path toward permanent residency and 
naturalized citizenship. Although South Korea 
has restrictive immigration policies, this group 
is singled out because of their ability to fill a vi-
tal social and economic need: to offset the “bride 
shortage” among Korean nationals and to increase 
the Korean-born population. In February, 2014, 
about 300,000 foreign spouses (mostly female) of 
3  Yoshihiro Makino, “South Korea struggles to welcome growing number of foreign workers,” Asahi Shimbun, May 11, 2013, accessed April 25, 
2014, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/korean_peninsula/AJ201305110007.
4   “Overview: Introduction of Employment Permit System,” Republic of Korea, Employment Permit System Website, accessed February 12, 2014, 
https://www.eps.go.kr/ph/index.html.
5  “Rights/Duty: Legal Rights,” Republic of Korea, Employment Permit System Website, accessed February 12, 2014, https://www.eps.go.kr/ph/
index.html.
6  Sarah Kim, “Multicultural families double over eight years,” Joongang Ilbo, October 14, 2015, accessed October 14, 2015, http://
koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=3010284.  
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Koreans resided in the ROK, about half of whom 
held foreign passports and half had become natu-
ralized ROK citizens.7 In rural areas, about 40 per-
cent of new marriages per year are between a Ko-
rean male and a foreign-born female.8 Unlike the 
migrant workers, the female marriage migrants 
are expected to reside permanently in South Ko-
rea, rear children, take care of their parents-in-
law, and assimilate into Korean society. The Korea 
Times summed up the changing demographic sit-
uation in a nutshell: “Given that one in 10 Koreans 
tie [sic] the knot with a foreigner and the number 
of children from such marriages has surpassed 
20,000 per year since 2010, it has become practi-
cally impossible to define Korean society without 
taking them into account.”9
Native Population Decline and Immigrant 
Family Growth
The in-migration of a significant group—“foreign 
brides” or “marriage migrants”—has been the sin-
gle exception to the ROK’s restrictive immigration 
policy, and the government has facilitated mar-
riage migration at the central and local levels. A 
combination of an acutely low birth rate among 
the native-born—the lowest among all OECD 
countries at 1.19—and the fastest-ageing popula-
tion in the OECD10 has become a looming threat 
to economic productivity, social stability, and the 
size of the military. 
The demographic crisis is well-understood by Ko-
rean leaders. A study commissioned by the Na-
tional Assembly concluded that South Koreans 
could “face natural extinction by 2750 if the birth-
rate were maintained at 1.19 children per wom-
an–assuming no reunification with North Korea 
or significant inflow of migrants.”11 In contrast to 
a precipitous decline in the native 9-24 age group, 
the number of multicultural adolescents increased 
by more than 21 percent from 2013 to 2014.12 The 
total size of South Korea’s labor force is expect-
ed to peak in 2016-2017 and decline thereafter; 
economic growth would shrink to 2.5 percent in 
2050, compared with 4.2 percent in 2011.13 In De-
cember, 2014, the Korea Economic Research In-
stitute issued a report concluding that continued 
and increased immigration is the only viable way 
to sustain an adequate labor force and economic 
growth (4.3 million in 2030; 11.8 million in 2050; 
15.3 million in 2060).14
In the security sector, military officials are formulat-
ing future troop size based on the declining number 
of potential recruits and are planning reductions 
7  Jeyup S. Kwaak, “South Korea Birthrate Hits Lowest on Record,” Wall Street Journal Asia, August 26, 2014, accessed December 15, 2014, http://
blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/08/26/south-korea-birthrate-hits-lowest-on-record/.
8  Andrei Lankov, “Foreign Wives stir Korean melting pot,” Asia Times Online, November 16, 2010, accessed April 28, 2015, http://www.atimes.
com/atimes/Korea/LK16Dg01.html.
9  Tae-hoon Lee, “Korea Needs Shift in Multicultural Policy,” The Korea Times, November 26, 2012, accessed February 19, 2014, http://www.
koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2014/03/180_125554.html.
10  “S.Korea has fastest aging population among advanced economies,” Yonhap News, September 9, 2014, accessed March 22, 2015, http://english.
yonhapnews.co.kr/full/2014/09/09/34/1200000000AEN20140909001800320F.html.
11 Jeyup S. Kwaak, “South Korea Birthrate.”
12  Jeong-mo Koo, “68,000 Multicultural Students…Projected to reach 100,000 in Three Years [다문화가정 학생 6만 8천명…3
년내 10만명 돌파 전망],” Yonhap News, September 21, 2014, accessed February 18, 2015, http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/
society/2014/09/20/0703000000AKR20140920042200004.HTML.
13  Neil Howe, Richard Jackson, and Keisuke Nakashima, The Aging of Korea: Demographics and Retirement Policy in the Land of the Morning 
Calm (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), March 2007, accessed January 27, 2008, http://csis.org/files/
media/csis/pubs/070321_gai_agingkorea_eng.pdf; “S. Korea’s average age to be highest in the world in 2045,” Yonhap News, June, 19, 2012, 
accessed September 30, 2013, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/06/19/95/0302000000AEN20120619001500320F.HTML.
14  Kwanwoo Jun, “South Korea May Need Up to 15 Million Immigrants, Study Says,” Wall Street Journal, December 15, 2014, accessed March 22, 
2015, http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/12/15/immigration-needed-to-bolster-workforce-study-says/.
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of soldiers from 552,000 to 387,000 by 2020.15 In 
February, 2012, compulsory military service law 
was changed to increase the eligibility pool and 
reflect a growing heterogeneous population; lan-
guage emphasizing ethnonationalism (“serving 
the nation and ethnicity”) was deleted and re-
placed with “serving the nation and its citizens.” 
The law formally recognized a multi-ethnic ROK 
military, requiring all male citizens, regardless of 
ethnic background, to perform the mandatory 
military service expected of all able-bodied Kore-
an men. Prior to this revision, the law exempted 
men who visibly appear to have phenotype (phys-
ical) features that reflect a mixed-race background 
from performing the mandatory service.16
The need for in-migration of foreign women also 
reflects changes in Korean women’s priorities 
about marriage. Women from the countryside 
migrate to urban areas in search of jobs and up-
wardly mobile husbands. In urban areas, they es-
chew middle-age bachelors or divorced men seek-
ing wives. In general, women are less interested in 
marriage than ever before: A recent government 
survey reported that only 45.6 percent of female 
respondents aged 9-24 said marriage was some-
thing they should do in life in contrast to 62.9 
percent of males, and in a survey of 2,361 college 




The ROK government formulated what Deborah 
Milly calls “orchestrated governance”18 through 
the Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea 
(2008). The top-down framework relies on cen-
tral policy planning that local governments and 
NGOs can adopt and support based on the spe-
cific strengths of the assistance-providing body 
and the particular needs of immigrants in spe-
cific locales. The Multicultural Families Support 
Act (2008) focuses on marriage migrants and 
multicultural children and families through lan-
guage classes, prenatal and child-rearing classes, 
educational support for children, employment of 
immigrant mothers as translators and interpreters 
at schools and counseling centers, and emergen-
cy centers and hotlines for victims of violence.19 
The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (Mo-
GEF) oversees these initiatives. 
Additionally, the government has tightened fi-
nancial eligibility requirements for Korean males 
seeking foreign wives in order to reduce the large 
portion of multicultural families that are living in 
poverty. Language requirements for prospective 
wives also have increased in order to encourage 
better communication between the newcom-
ers and their spouses and local communities. 
15  Elizabeth Hervey Stephen, “Policy Concerns of Low Fertility for Military Planning in South Korea,” Analysis from the East-West Center 102 
(2011): 3. 
16  Min-ah Lim, “An era of Multicultural National Defense: 1000 Multicultural Military Personnel [국방다문화시대:
다문화장병 1천명시대],” Yonhap News, November 20, 2014, accessed February 24, 2015, http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/
bulletin/2014/11/20/0200000000AKR20141120154800372.HTML.
17  Mihye Go, “Threat of population decline: women marrying at 30…decline of birth rate [인구절벽위기: 여성들 30살은돼야결혼...
출산율낮아져],” Seoul Economic Daily, February 6, 2015, accessed February 9, 2015, http://economy.hankooki.com/lpage/economy/201502/
e2015020610182469890.htm.
18  Deborah  J.  Milly,  New Policies for New Residents: Immigrants, Advocacy, and Governance in Japan and Beyond (Ithaca: Cornell University  
Press, 2014), 141-143; The Act is available at http://www.moleg.go.kr/lawinfo/engLawInfo?pstSeq=47161&searchCondition=UsrDef2&search 
Keyword=foreign.
19  The Act is available at http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=29049&lang=ENG. Regarding 24-7 hotlines, see Philip Iglauer, 
“South Korea’s Foreign Bride Problem: The government tries to tackle the thorny issue of migrant brides and domestic violence,” The 
Diplomat, January 29, 2015, accessed March 22, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/south-koreas-foreign-bride-problem.
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Authorities also have increased oversight of ex-
ploitative private agencies that recruit women for 
marriage migration. The government budget for 
multicultural family programs (which involves the 
Ministry of Education and other relevant agencies) 
ballooned from 200 million won (US $195,000) in 
2005 to 181 billion won (US $170 million) in 2014.20
Citizenship requirements for marriage migrants 
were simplified and expedited since 2004.21 While 
the simplified process normally requires the appli-
cant to reside in Korea for more than three years 
and pass written exams on language & culture, 
the special rule for marriage immigrants requires 
only two years and generally exempts them from 
written culture exams. The assumption was that 
the immigrant spouse would gradually learn the 
Korean language and culture. Additionally, the 
normally required interview was eliminated with 
the understanding that interview materials used 
for the marriage process would be adequate. A 
report by the International Organization for Mi-
gration (IOM) on Korea’s naturalization require-
ments states that between the early 2000s and 
2012, marriage immigrants composed about 70 
percent of total naturalizations and at the writing 
of the report in 2013 composed 82.6 percent.22
Foreign nationals and new immigrants in Korea 
provide labor and replenish the national population 
pool. The women also serve as unpaid care-givers 
for the growing number of elderly family mem-
bers. However, their differences with native Ko-
reans in terms of physical features, language, and 
customs are sources of social tensions and anxi-
ety for the mainstream population. The discrim-
ination that the women experience often trickles 
down to their children. 
More than 200,000 “mixed race” or “mixed-ethnic” 
children are Korean citizens by birth and compose 
South Korea’s “multicultural families” together 
with their parents. The Support for Multicultural 
Families Act, enacted in September 2008, defines 
“multicultural family” as consisting of a Korean 
national and immigrant spouse and their chil-
dren. The birth rate among immigrant mothers is 
higher than that of native Korean women, and the 
number of school-age children from mixed ethnic 
families enrolled in schools grew more than sev-
en-fold from 9,389 in 2006 (the first year the gov-
ernment began compiling official figures) to 67,806 
in 2014.23 In 2014, the proportion of South Korean 
youths to the country’s overall population reached 
its lowest level ever at 19.5 percent.24 By contrast, 
the number of multicultural adolescents increased 
by more than 21 percent from 2013.25 The student 
population consisted of 48,297 (71.2% of total) in 
primary school; 12,525 (18.5%) in middle school; 
6,984 (10.3%) in high school.26 
20  Hyo-shik Chung, “Budget Increasing Annually for Multiculturalism…Reverse Discrimination Controversy against Single-Parent Families  
[해마다 뛰는 다문화 예산 … 한부모가정 역차별 논란],” JoongAng Ilbo, February 10, 2014, accessed February 10, 2015, http://news.joins.
com/article/13846534. 
21  International Organization for Migration, Study on the Improvement of Naturalization System of the Republic of Korea: Focusing on the 
Naturalization System for Marriage Migrants IOM MRTC Research Report Series No. 04, (Gyeonggi-do, Republic of Korea: IOM Migrant 
Research and Training Center, 2014), accessed April 28, 2015, http://www.iom-mrtc.org/lib/download.php?file_name=IOM%20MRTC%20
RR%202014-04.pdf&save_file=b_201501012210170.pdf. 
22 Ibid.
23  A further breakdown shows that the student population consisted of 48,297 (71.2% of total) in primary school; 12,525 (18.5%) in middle 
school; 6,984 (10.3%) in high school; Republic of Korea, Ministry of Education, April 2014: Statistics on the Current Status of Multicultural 
Students [다문화 학생 통계 현황 14.4월], (Seoul: Government of the Republic of Korea, October 15, 2014), accessed February 23, 2015, 
http://www.moe.go.kr/web/100068/ko/board/download.do?boardSeq=120777.
24  “[Editorial] Demographic Structure,” Korea Herald, July 14, 2014, accessed August 10, 2014, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.
php?ud=20140714000570.
25 Jeong-mo Koo, “68,000 Multicultural Students.”
26 Ibid.
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Children of part Chinese descent composed 34.4 
percent; 19.5 percent of part Japanese descent; 
16.5 percent of part Vietnamese descent; 14.3 
percent, part Filipino, followed by Thai (2.2) and 
Mongolian (2).27 An estimated third of all chil-
dren born in 2020 (1.67 million) are expected to 
be of part Korean and part other Asian descent 
(“Kosian”), composing 3.3 percent of the total 
population.28 Immigrants and Koreans of hetero-
geneous parentage will literally change the face of 
Korea for the long duration, but they also present 
the society with urgent policy tasks. 
In late 2012, the National Human Rights Com-
mission of South Korea reported that 42 percent 
of multiracial children surveyed in a recent poll 
had been “teased or discriminated against by their 
classmates for their inability to pronounce Kore-
an words properly.”29 A recent Seoul City survey 
“showed that four out of five foreign teenagers 
were not in school, largely because of discrimina-
tion and bullying.”30 In 2008, government reports 
revealed that 15.4 percent of multicultural chil-
dren aged 7 to 12 did not attend school (22 times 
the national average)31 along with 39.7 percent of 
junior high school age children and 70 percent of 
high school age children.32 Social marginalization 
persists to the detriment of children’s schooling. 
Korean Chinese (joseonjok)
Chinese migrants, especially of Korean descent 
(joseonjok), have comprised the largest group of 
labor migrants. Geographic proximity, language 
familiarity, and in some cases, access to relatives 
in the ROK have made it easier for them to enter 
Korea and for Koreans to receive them as “distant 
kin” who share commonalities and are not fully 
foreign. Joseonjok occupy a higher rung on the 
hierarchy of foreign nationals than migrants of 
non-ethnic Korean descent and enjoy some pref-
erential treatment, akin to Japan’s nikkeijin (“re-
turn-migrants”) from Brazil and Peru.33
In 2007, the ROK government created the “’Visit 
and Employment Program” (H-2 visa) for ethnic 
Koreans with Chinese citizenship, which per-
mits free entry into and departure from Korea for 
three years to work in specific economic sectors 
that require low-skill labor (construction, light 
27  “Number of Multicultural Kids in School Grows Explosively,” Chosun Ilbo (English), September 22, 2012, accessed March 3, 2014, http://
english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/09/22/2012092200339.html. 
28  Chul-jae Lee, Ae-rahn Han, Kang-hyun Chung, and Ho-jung Kim, “Potential of political empowerment of Kosians [코시안 정치세력화 
가능성],” JoongAng Ilbo, April 4, 2006, accessed December 15, 2014, http://article.joins.com/news/article/article.asp?total_id=2250434.
29  “Multicultural Children Still Face Discrimination,” Chosun Ilbo (English), January 11, 2012, accessed August 3, 2014, http://english.chosun.
com/site/data/html_dir/2012/01/11/2012011101030.html. 
30  Young-won Kim, “Korean society struggles to embrace multiculturalism,” Jakarta Post, June 19, 2012, accessed February 19, 2014, www.
thejakartapost.com/news/2012/06/19/korean-society-struggles-embrace-multiculturalism.html.
31  Martin Fackler, “Baby Boom of Mixed Children Tests South Korea,” New York Times, November 28, 2009, accessed May 25, 2014, http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/11/29/world/asia/29babies.html?pagewanted=all.
32  Republic of Korea, National Assembly, National Assembly Inspection Policy Report: 70 percent of Multicultural Students Not Attending High 
School [다문화가정 자녀 70% 고등학교 안다녀], (Seoul: Government of the Republic of Korea, October 24, 2008), accessed February 23, 
2015, http://stat.mw.go.kr/stat_manager/modules/download.jsp?bbsSeq=15&nttSeq=11191&atchSeq=1244.
33  Takeyuki Tsuda, “The permanence of ‘temporary’ migration: The ‘structural embeddedness’ of Japanese-Brazilian migrant workers in Japan,” 
Journal of Asian Studies 58, no. 3 (1999): 687–722; Takeyuki Tsuda, Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland: Japanese Brazilian Return Migration in 
Transnational Perspective (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Hiromi Mori, “Migrant Workers and Labor Market Segmentation 
in Japan,” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 3, no. 4 (1994): 619-638; Michael Orlando Sharpe, “What Does Blood Membership Mean in 
Political Terms?: The Political Incorporation of Latin American Nikkeijin (Japanese Descendants) (LAN) in Japan 1990–2004,” Japanese 
Journal of Political Science 12, no. 1 (2011): 113-142; Daniela de Carvalho, “Nikkei Communities in Japan,” in Global Japan : The Experience 
of Japan’s New Immigrant and Overseas Communities, eds. Roger Goodman et al. (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003); Angelo Akimitsu 
Ishi, “Between Privilege and Prejudice: Japanese –Brazilian Migrants in ‘the Land of Yen and the Ancestors,’” in Transcultural Japan: At the 
Borderlands of Race, Gender and Identity, eds. David Blake Willis et al. (New York: Routledge, 2007).
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manufacturing, and services).34 In 2005, the Min-
istry of Justice established a program that applied 
only to joseonjok in order to legalize the status 
of those who were undocumented. The Volun-
tary Departure Program offered undocument-
ed joseonjok workers to leave Korea voluntarily 
in return for legal visas (after a one-year hiatus 
abroad), which would permit them to reenter Ko-
rea and work for up to three years.35 The joseonjok 
have received the most policy attention among 
migrant worker and immigrant groupings.36
However, many analysts point out that “co-na-
tionality [sic., co-ethnicity] can be recognized but 
full equality denied.”37 Workplace accidents are a 
form of danger to the hundreds of thousands of 
foreign workers in Korea. Undocumented work-
ers have borne the lion’s share of them because 
they tend to work for bosses or businesses that 
emphasize cost-saving over worker safety and 
protection. Korean-Chinese are no exception. The 
South China Morning Post reported that “[c]on-
struction industry insiders, meanwhile, estimated 
that their sector alone hires some 300,000 legal 
and illegal Korean-Chinese workers. South Kore-
an employers, they argued, still hired ethnic Kore-
ans without work permits because their illegal sta-
tus would prevent them from protesting against 
harsh working environments and demanding 
better treatment.”38 In July, 2013, five out of nine 
deaths from industrial accidents in Seoul were of 
Chinese nationals of Korean ethnicity.39
Ethnonationalism and New Koreans
The growth of international marriages and mixed 
families amounts to a social revolution in a so-
ciety steeped in the belief that Koreans uniquely 
hail from thousands of years of “pure” ancestral 
bloodlines, common language, customs, and 
history.40 Many scholars have demonstrated that 
Koreans on both sides of the 38th parallel have 
adopted constructed notions of ethnocentrism 
and ethno-nationalism as inherent or even con-
stitutional parts of Korea’s and Koreans’ identities 
since the Japanese colonial era and the struggle 
to reclaim sovereignty.41 Historian Andre Schmid 
traces the historiography further to turn-of-the-
century intellectuals’ desire to “decenter” China as 
the Middle Kingdom and to frame national histo-
ry as familial history rather than court-centered 
history.42 The emphasis on bloodline and ancestry 
facilitates a familial orientation among people of 
Korean descent as belonging to the Korean “race” 
irrespective of actual kinship and citizenship. (Ko-
rean citizenship law is based on the principle of 
jus sanguinis or citizenship by bloodline.)
34  Dong-Hoon Seol and John D. Skrentny, “Ethnic Return of Migration and Hierarchical Nationhood: Korean Chinese Foreign Workers in 
South Korea,” Ethnicities 9 (2009): 154. 
35 Ibid., 157. 
36 Ibid., 152.
37 Ibid., 149.
38  Audrey Yoo, “Industrial accidents in South Korea raise questions on treatment of Korean-Chinese migrant workers,” South China Morning 
Post, August 1, 2013, accessed April 21, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/article/1293615/industrial-accidents-south-korea-raise-questions-
treatment-chinese-korean-migrant.
39 Ibid.
40  For a discussion on marriage migration as a source of multicultural transformations in South Korea, see: Choong Soon Kim, Voices of Foreign 
Brides: The Roots and Development of Multiculturalism in Korea, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011); Yoonkyung Lee assesses the 
growing openness of Korean society to demographic and cultural heterogeneity as reflected in the media and popular culture. See “Migration, 
Migrants, and Contested Ethno-Nationalism in Korea,” Critical Asian Studies 41, no. 3 (2009).
41  Gi-wook Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006); Andre Schmid, 
Korea Between Empires: 1895-1919 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Henry Em, The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and 
Historiography in Modern Korea (Durham, NC: Duke University, 2013); Sheila Miyoshi Jager, Narratives of Nation Building in Korea: A 
Genealogy of Patriotism, (M.E. Sharpe, 2003).
42 Schmid, 190-191.
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The Korean word for “state” is also infused with fa-
milism, as gukga translates literally into “state-fam-
ily” and refers to the “collectivity of government, 
land, and people.”43 Such identity construction al-
lows North Koreans to be of the same national fam-
ily even though a bloody war was fought and actual 
families have remained separated for over six de-
cades. Two separate surveys conducted in 2014 by 
the Asan Institute and Seoul National University 
revealed that ethnicity still remains the primary 
reason for the necessity of reunification.44
Yet, many South Koreans today seem to be mak-
ing genuine efforts to examine and overcome their 
biases when compared with neighboring societies 
of Taiwan and Japan, which also struggle with the 
need for marriage migrants amid the majority 
population’s resistance. Although Taiwan, like the 
ROK, has severely low birth rates, foreign mothers 
from two leading sending countries, China and 
Vietnam, do not bear more children than Taiwan-
ese mothers. One explanation is that women from 
these countries are familiar with family plan-
ning.45 But the fact that Taiwan’s public discourse 
derogates what is assumed to be a decline in “pop-
ulation quality” engendered by women who come 
from poorer countries in Southeast Asia may be 
a disincentive. In 2004, Taiwan’s Deputy Minister 
of Education publicly urged his ministry officials 
to discourage foreign brides from having many 
babies and encourage contraception for the sake 
of population quality.46 Sara Friedman emphasiz-
es that Chinese women from the mainland who 
marry Taiwanese men exercise only “partial citi-
zenship” because of their compromised political 
identity as originating from the People’s Republic 
of China.47
Although Japan confronts dire population prob-
lems similar to those of the ROK, thus far, it has 
gone out of its way to avoid and prevent perma-
nent in-migration of foreigners. From 1992 to 
2012, about 350,000 marriage migrants arrived in 
Japan, which is a tiny figure per capita compared 
to South Korea. The Japanese government does 
not pursue a policy of importing foreign brides or 
expending central government funds for accultur-
ation and integration programs.48 
Younger Koreans in particular are more civ-
ic-minded and less fixated on ethnonational mark-
ers of identity in comparison to their age group 
ten years ago and to the older generation today. 
They are more open-minded about the require-
ments of “Korean-ness.” A recent survey by the 
Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul revealed 
that only 55.4 percent of respondents in their 20s 
believe “having Korean bloodline” is an important 
component of Korean identity compared to 82.4 
percent aged 60 and over. A remarkably high per-
centage (between 90.4 and 95.4) of all respondents 
believe “abiding by Korean political and legal 
43  Kyung Moon Hwang, “Country or State? Reconceptualizing Kukka in the Korean Enlightenment Period, 1896-1910,” Korean Studies 24, no. 1 
(2000): 13; Nan Kim, Crossing the Divide: Memory, Reconciliation, and Reunions in South Korea (New York: Lexington Books, forthcoming). 
44  Jiyoon Kim, Karl Friedhoff, Chungko Kang, Euicheol Lee, 2014 Asan Public Opinion Report: South Korean Attitudes toward North Korea and 
Reunification (Seoul: The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2015), 20; “Presentation of 2014 Survey on Attitude towards Reunification [2014 
통일의식조사 발표],” Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul University, October 1, 2014, accessed April 29, 2015, http://knsi.org/
knsi/admin/work/works/141020%202014%20%ED%86%B5%EC%9D%BC%EC%9D%98%EC%8B%9D%EC%A1%B0%EC%82%AC%20
%EB%B0%9C%ED%91%9C%20%EC%9E%90%EB%A3%8C%EC%A7%91.pdf.
45  Wen-Shan Yang and Melody Chia-Wen Lu, eds., Asian Cross-Border Marriage Migration: Demographic Patterns and Social Issues, Vol. 2 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010).
46  Hsiao-Chuan Hsia, “Foreign Brides, Multiple Citizenship and the Immigrant Movement in Taiwan,” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 18, 
no. 1 (2009): 29-31.
47  Sara Friedman, “Marital Immigration and Graduated Citizenship: Post-Naturalization Restrictions on Mainland Chinese Spouses,” Pacific 
Affairs 83, no. 1 (2010): 73-93. 
48  James Green, “Japan lags behind Asian neighbors in protecting marriage migrants,” Asahi Shimbun, February 15, 2013, accessed September 
21, 2014, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201302150075.
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systems” is a vital part of being Korean. Jiyoon 
Kim, who authored the study, comments that 
nearly 80 percent of respondents in 2005 and 2010 
believed that Korean bloodline was important to 
being Korean but that in 2013, the figure dropped 
to 65.8 percent and “as many as 30.4 percent 
thought that sharing the same bloodline is not im-
portant to being Korean.”49 (emphasis added)
Nevertheless, caution is necessary when assess-
ing survey data that show increased acceptance of 
ethnic and other forms of heterogeneity in South 
Korea. First, despite the fact that the ROK changed 
its citizenship law in 1997 from patrilineage to 
bilineage (meaning that a child born to a female 
Korean citizen and non-Korean male is eligible 
for Korean citizenship), most Koreans in everyday 
life, old and young, still consider “bloodline” to 
be determined by the father. In this context, chil-
dren in multicultural families might be viewed as 
“Korean” if their father is a native Korean, which 
would reinforce the notion of Korean ancestral 
continuity. Second, given the growing numbers 
of older Koreans and their generally conservative 
tendency in voting behavior and policy preferenc-
es, their continued emphasis on traditional forms 
of Korean identity—bloodline and singular ethnic 
ancestry—reflects significant obstacles to social 
acceptance and equal treatment of immigrants 
and their mixed-ethnic families.
The 2009 Hyundai Research Institute report on 
the steps needed to develop South Korea into a 
mature, multicultural society bears heeding. At 
the time, their assessment of South Korean soci-
ety’s acceptance of other cultures was one of the 
worst in the world.50 The study by Asan Institute 
in 2014 revealed that 32 percent of Koreans view 
mixed-race families as a “threat to social cohe-
sion.”51 Furthermore, a study by the Ministry of 
Gender Equality and Family in 2012 revealed 
that 86.5 percent of South Koreans emphasize 
the importance of blood lineage, and only 36 per-
cent answered favorably about the coexistence of 
diverse races, religions, and cultures in South Ko-
rea, which is less than half of the average 74 per-
cent among 18 European countries.52
These examples point to social and political fault 
lines within the South Korean polity. Whether and 
how Korean democracy might accept New Kore-
ans as true citizens and compatriots with equal ac-
cess to the assertion of rights, interests, and voices 
to influence the future of South Korean politics 
and policies is a critical question. Whether and 
how currently marginalized New Koreans might 
not only exercise the rights of citizenship, but also 
take responsibility for improving the conditions of 
their respective groups and develop a more robust 
democracy is a companion question.  
Public education that offers accurate, thought-
ful information from multiple perspectives, es-
pecially those of migrants and immigrants and 
their families, and debates that encourage the 
exchange of such perspectives are key to develop-
ing a culture of sociopolitical tolerance and inclu-
sion. Jiyoon Kim observes that “well-publicized 
49  Jiyoon Kim, “National Identity under Transformation: New Challenges to South Korea,” Asan Institute for Policy Studies, January 25, 2014, 
accessed January 30, 2014, http://www.theasanforum.org/national-identity-under-transformation-new-challenges-to-south-korea/.
50  “Characteristics and Implications of Domestic Multiculturalism [국내 다문화 현상의 특징과 시사점],” Global Economy Crisis: Hyundai 
Research Institute 373, no.09-44 (2009): 8.
51  Jiyoon Kim, Chungku Kang, and Euicheol Lee, “Issue Brief – Closed off Korea: South Korean Perception of Multiculturalism and Policy  
[닫힌대한민국: 한국인의다문화인식과정책],” The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, February 4, 2014, accessed February 23, 2015, http://
asaninst.org/wp-content/themes/twentythirteen/action/dl.php?id=28587.
52  Yoo-hyun Chang, “86.5% of Citizens Stress ‘Blood Lineage,’ Negative on Multiculturalism [국민 86.5% ‘한국인혈통 중시’, 다문화에 
부정적],” JoongAng Ilbo, April 19, 2012, accessed April 29, 2015, http://article.joins.com/news/article/article.asp?Total_Id=7939576.
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propaganda distributed by the government to 
treat multiethnic and multicultural families well 
has facilitated accommodating civic nationalism 
instead of ethnic nationalism to a certain extent.”53 
The Korean government’s efforts to make available 
school textbooks that address multiculturalism 
would also facilitate public understanding of de-
mographic and related social changes. 
But Mi Ok Kang, author of Multicultural Educa-
tion in South Korea, explains the growing politics 
over multicultural education.54 As more teaching 
resources become available and scholars, teachers, 
book publishers, business leaders, and the central 
and local governments get involved in determin-
ing “appropriate content.” She finds worrisome the 
trend since 2010 to reduce the number of govern-
ment-authorized Korean language arts textbooks 
and the related narrowing of ways to teach and 
learn multicultural curricula and argues for “crit-
ical multicultural education” as a way to develop 
“a full dimension of multicultural/multilingual 
others’ identities without transmitting distorted 
images of migrant others.”55
The learning gap and social discrimination are 
high. A study by the Korea Institute of Child 
Care and Education, published in 2012, found 
that 40 percent of multiracial children had diffi-
culty speaking Korean because their immigrant 
mothers lacked fluency. The study found that 
youngsters who had attended childcare support 
centers or had accessed other such public services 
scored higher on the language test.56 The Korean 
government stepped up to fund daycare centers, 
special kindergartens, and other educational sup-
port programs for the children. The Korea Times 
reported in March, 2015 that the Ministry of Edu-
cation runs “80 education institutes where multi-
racial students can learn the Korean language and 
culture for six months before starting their edu-
cation in ordinary schools” and that the number 
would rise to 100 in 2015. Given the current figure 
of 121,000 preschool students from multicultural 
families, such programs are expected to expand to 
the higher grades to accommodate the children’s 
educational development.57 
The government has also designated 150 schools 
to offer programs to raise awareness about mul-
ticulturalism with all students. In the late 2000s, 
multiple government ministries (Education, Sci-
ence and Technology or MEST; Gender Equality 
and Family; Justice) and provincial governments 
jointly established projects to develop teachers, 
curricula, and school environments that would 
foster multicultural education. MEST initiated the 
“Multicultural Family-Student Education Support 
Project” in 2009 and funded selected universi-
ty education schools (departments) to develop 
teacher-training and courses for the future. A to-
tal of about US $1.4 million were invested, “more 
than one-fourth of the total budget for multicul-
tural children in 2009.”58 Nancy Abelmann and 
her co-authors, who published an assessment of 
the project’s planning process concluded that the 
53 Ibid.
54  Mi Ok Kang, Multicultural Education in South Korea: Language, Ideology, and Culture in Korean Language Arts Education (New York: 
Routledge, 2015).
55  Ibid. Also see Andrew Eungi Kim, “Demography, Migration and Multiculturalism in South Korea,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, February 1, 2009, 
accessed October 21, 2014, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Andrew_Eungi-Kim/3035/article.html.
56  Bo-eun Kim, “40% of multiracial children have difficulty with Korean,” The Korea Times, June 13, 2012, accessed April 12, 2014, http://www.
koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/06/117_112997.html.
57  Min-ho Jung, “Ministry to run 30 kindergartens for multiracial children,” The Korea Times, March 17, 2015, accessed March 30, 2015, http://
www.koreatimesus.com/ministry-to-run-30-kindergartens-for-multiracial-children.
58  Nancy Abelmann et al., “Makeshift Multiculturalism: The Transformation of Elementary School Teacher Training” in Multiethnic Korea? 
Multiculturalism, Migration, and Peoplehood Diversity in Contemporary South Korea, ed. John Lie (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 
Institute of East Asian Studies, 2015), 99.
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development of multicultural education in South 
Korea was in a “makeshift” state, characterized by 
“considerable confusion and a space for genera-
tive activity, honest reflection…or even [positive] 
unintended consequences.”59
 
Various media outlets serve an important function 
as informational and cultural mediators through 
multilingual programming via television, radio, in-
ternet, and mobile devices, including public service 
news to assist foreign workers and multicultural 
families, as well as entertainment. Migrant World 
Television (MWTV), a multi-ethnic broadcaster, 
is operated by immigrants and temporary foreign 
workers. Major Korean outlets such as TBS, EBS, 
Arirang, and Woongjin Foundation, in addition to 
regional outlets, are engaged in diversifying and 
cross-fertilizing information and cultural con-
tent among the growing heterogeneous Korean 
population. Multicultural Music Broadcasting 
was established by the Woongjin Foundation in 
2008 for the explicit purpose of serving the needs 
of migrant workers and marriage immigrants. 
“DJs from China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Thai-
land, Japan, Mongolia, Russia and Egypt pro-
vide Korea-related information and useful living 
tips, while also introducing popular music from 
around the globe. Starting in November [2010], 
the Woongjin Foundation aired 60 animated 
children’s tales from China, Japan, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Mongolia and Thailand through their 
satellite TV station.”60
Laws that establish the boundaries between free-
dom of expression and association and outright 
racial/ethnic discrimination and violence are ur-
gently needed. After Bonojit Hussain, a research 
professor at Seoul’s Sungkonghoe University was 
racially accosted by an ethnic-Korean man in July, 
2009, he brought the case to the police to file charges 
and to the attention of the ROK National Human 
Rights Commission. His one-man activism to ad-
dress the injustice took him to the National As-
sembly, whose members were forced (or inspired) 
to debate legislation that bans discrimination and 
racist acts. Although bills were considered several 
times, the last in 2012, no anti-discrimination law 
has been passed. Virulent opposition, especially by 
right-wing Christian groups, forced an end to the 
debate in the legislature, and some politicians who 
had supported such legislation backed off in the 
face of threats by the conservative activists.61 
The ROK will be pressured from within and by the 
international community to develop legal standards 
and safeguards against racism and discrimination 
as the population grows more diverse. The Unit-
ed Nations Special Rapporteur on racism issued a 
call in October, 2014 for the Korean government 
to step up and pass comprehensive anti-discrimi-
nation laws and to “fight racism and discrimination 
through better education, as well as ensuring that 
the media is sensitive and conscious of the respon-
sibility to avoid racist and xenophobic stereotypes 
and that perpetrators are punished where appro-
priate.”62 He and others have urged the ROK gov-
ernment to ratify the International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families. 
59 Ibid., 114.  
60  Sojung Yoon, “Radio stations help spread multiculturalism in Korea,” Korea.Net, March 11, 2011, accessed July 18, 2015, http://www.korea.
net/NewsFocus/Society/view?articleId=85600.
61  “Indian pushes Korea to right race wrongs,” IndiaToday, September 30, 2009, accessed September 17, 2015, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/
story/Indian+pushes+Korea+to+right+race+wrongs/1/64140.html; Sang-Hoon Choe, “South Koreans Struggle With Race,” New York Times, 
November 1, 2009, accessed September 17, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/02/world/asia/02race.html?_r=0; Ji-hye Jun, “Legal 
protection needed against racial discrimination,” The Korea Times, June 26, 2013, accessed September 22, 2015, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/
www/common/printpreview.asp?categoryCode=116&newsIdx=138155. 
62  “Republic of Korea: UN rights experts urges adoption of anti-discrimination law,” United Nations News Centre, October 9, 2014, accessed 
September 22, 2015, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49038#.VgRLCl_D_ct.
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New Koreans and Political Participation
The ROK government does not have affirmative 
action-type programs for naturalized Koreans 
and other legal immigrants to serve in govern-
ment, as it does for defectors from North Korea. 
Immigrants generally do not have easy access to 
understanding the South Korean political system, 
process, or norms, and because most work in the 
private sphere as wife, mother, daughter-in-law, 
and housekeeper, they are not necessarily expect-
ed to become political or participate in public life. 
The ROK government provides a domesticated 
acculturation program for foreign brides: Text-
books that teach Korean language and programs 
that teach Korean culture focus almost singularly 
on cooking Korean dishes, relationships within 
the family, especially with the mother-in-law, and 
looking after children and their school work.  
Immigrants and migrant workers have taken ini-
tiatives to organize their own civic, cultural, and 
religious groups, and some have organized po-
litically and engaged in activism for better labor 
conditions, anti-discrimination education for the 
Korean society, and legal protections for wom-
en who are abused by their Korean husbands or 
parents-in-law. They also have South Korean ad-
vocates and supporters from a broader political 
spectrum of civil society than do the defectors 
from North Korea. Foreign wives, documented 
and undocumented foreign workers, and native 
Korean activists together claim public space for 
social and political interaction and interest-for-
mulation regarding immigration policy, the pro-
motion and protection of foreign nationals’ rights, 
and the transformation of educational and cultur-
al institutions to prevent discrimination against 
multicultural families.
The prevention of violence against foreign wives 
(by their family members) and legal punishment 
of perpetrators is a pressing demand. A rash of vi-
olent crimes, including aggravated battery, rape, 
and killing of marriage migrants, particularly from 
Vietnam,63 heightened both the native and 
non-native communities’ awareness of the serious 
problems of the foreign-born and their mixed-eth-
nic children.64
Like in Japan, local governments in areas with 
large numbers of immigrants and migrant work-
ers have taken initiatives to include foreigners in 
communal life and respond to their particular 
needs. Ansan City is a good example, where the 
local government has been supporting foreign na-
tionals and immigrants through a variety of com-
munity services, including language, sports and 
driver’s license classes as well as legal advice on 
visa status and employment.65 Wongok village in 
63  The following are examples of violence against Vietnamese women: 2007, Daejeon: 47-year-old Korean man beats to death 19-year-old 
woman after one month of marriage; 2008, Tran Thi Lan, 22, commits suicide by jumping off high-rise within one month of marriage; 2010, 
Busan: a mentally ill Korean husband beats and stabs to death his 20-year-old wife on her eighth day in Korea; 2011, Kyeongsangdo: Hoang 
Thi Nam, age 23, stabbed 53 times by her 37-year-old husband, Lim Chae Won. Hoang had lived in a shelter for abused foreign wives during 
most of 2010; 2014, Busan: Vo Thi Minh Phuong, 27, committed suicide with her two children by jumping out of her 18th floor apartment. 
She blamed her husband for beating her.
64  “Another Vietnamese Bride Murdered in South Korea,”NamVietNews, May 29,2011, accessed March 3, 2014, http://namvietnews.wordpress.
com/2011/05/29/another-vietnamese-bride-murdered-in-south-korea/; Si-soo Park, “Murderer of Vietnamese Wife Gets 12-Year Jail 
Sentence,” The Korea Times, March 13, 2008, accessed March 2, 2014, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2015/04/117_20693.
html; “Vietnamese Woman in South Korea Commits Suicide with Two Children,” VietNamNet, November 26, 2012, accessed March 2, 2014, 
http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/society/53366/vietnamese-woman-in-south-korea-commits-suicide-with-two-children.html; Jennie Le, “Til 
Death Do Us Part: Foreign Vietnamese Brides Killed in South Korea,” One Vietnam, Vietnam Talking Points, June 8, 2011, accessed March 2, 
2014, http://talk.onevietnam.org/til-death-do-us-part-foreign-vietnamese-bride-killed-in-south-korea/.
65  Si-soo Park and Rachel Lee, “Ansan – ghetto or multicultural enclave?,” The Korea Times, April 17, 2013, accessed February 18, 2015, http://
www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/culture/2013/04/386_134111.html; Sun-min Lee, “Multiculturalism matures in Ansan,” Korea JoongAng 
Daily, October 1, 2011, accessed February 18, 2015, http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=2942822.
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Ansan has gone so far as to declare itself a “bor-
derless village” in recognition of two-thirds of its 
population being non-Korean.66
In recent years, electoral politics has become a new 
venue for the articulation of immigrants’ interests. 
Judith Hernandez, originally from the Philippines, 
was the first foreign-born naturalized Korean cit-
izen to run for a seat in the 2008 ROK National 
Assembly election. Hernandez’s commitment to 
a multicultural Korean society won her support 
from the immigrant community, as well as from 
those political parties that were seeking the sup-
port of foreign-born residents in South Korea. 
But Jasmin Barcunay Lee (Jasmin Lee), another 
Philippines-born immigrant, was the first to 
achieve a seat in the National Assembly in 2012 
as a naturalized Korean. She is a member of the 
Saenuri (ruling) Party and succeeded through 
proportional representation. 
Like Hernandez, Lee is the widow of a Korean 
man and the mother of multicultural children. 
Her election was hailed by some Koreans and ob-
servers around the world as path-breaking, but 
South Koreans’ ethno-nationalistic and xenopho-
bic sentiment was also apparent on internet sites. 
The protestations ranged from a form of economic 
protectionism against public funds being spent on 
foreigners (“Korea gives foreigners benefits which 
it doesn’t even give to its nationals”) to anti-mul-
ticulturalism (“Unlike the United States or China, 
Korea has been a racially homogeneous country. I 
don’t know why we need multiculturalism.”).67 
The new immigrants’ relationships with political 
parties are tenuous. Many naturalized Koreans do 
not vote or vote according to their husbands’ or 
in-laws’ preferences. Whether they exercise their 
voting privileges as their linguistic and cultural 
adaptation to South Korean life advances is an 
important question. Research is needed on how 
the Korean-born multiethnic children view their 
relationship with Korean democracy as they come 
of political age and whether they press political 
parties to represent their interests over time. Like 
in many in-migration societies, it is more likely 
for the second generation of multicultural fami-
ly members to exercise more fully their political 
rights than the immigrant generation. 
It is also possible that immigrants and their offspring 
will insert their interests more clearly through party 
representation as their numbers continue to grow 
and South Korea confronts more fully the com-
plexities of identity and minority politics. Thus far, 
conservative and liberal parties cautiously render 
support for a multicultural Korea, but prejudices re-
main high barriers to actual electoral participation 
by immigrants. It is also possible that political parties 
will woo and recruit minority groups as the latter’s 
political presence and voice grow. In the context of 
unification politics, anti-immigration and ethnically 
identified parties might emerge. 
Immigrants’ experience with different types of 
democratic procedures and norms prior to en-
tering Korean political life will significantly affect 
their capacity to adapt to Korean democracy. Be-
cause the home countries of many migrants range 
from authoritarian systems as in China and Uz-
bekistan, democracies like the Philippines, fledg-
ling democracies like Mongolia, and reform-ori-
ented systems like Vietnam, New Koreans are not 
at the same starting point for understanding and 
acculturating to Korean political life. 
66 Park and Lee, “Ansan.”
67  Rahn Kim, “Jasmine Lee faces racial backlash,” The Korea Times, August 15, 2012, accessed May 12, 2013, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/
news/nation/2012/04/117_109014.html. 
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Impact on Foreign Policy 
 
There are inevitable impacts, both positive and 
negative, that the experiences of New Koreans 
have on South Korea’s diplomatic, economic, and 
people-to-people relations with the respective 
sending country. The mistreatment of foreign 
women, in particular the violent abuse by their 
Korean family members or labor/marriage bro-
kers, can strain bilateral relations. Foreign work-
ers who are denied their wages or basic health and 
safety protections can pressure their embassies 
and NGOs in Korea and their home country to 
advocate on their behalf. The negative impressions 
of South Korean society that foreign nationals and 
naturalized Korean citizens pass on to their kin 
and friends in their country of origin can generate 
distrust and animosity toward Korea and Koreans. 
Also, foreign policy tensions affect relations 
among different types of Koreans. There are 
reports that when Korea-Japan competition over 
Dokdo/Takeshima Japan flares up, ethnically 
Korean school children blame Japanese-Kore-
ans, and “[w]hen disputes with China rise, Chi-
nese-Koreans become the target.”68 The actions of 
non-state actors also apply as in the case of Islamic 
State (IS). Pakistani and other Muslim residents 
in Korea have grown fearful of a backlash against 
them by Koreans because of the shock and con-
cern among East Asians following the execution 
of two Japanese nationals by IS in January, 2015. 
As Koreans realize that such terror threats can be 
linked to their own country, especially because 
the government supports U.S.-led anti-terror pol-
icies, Muslims and those who are assumed to be 
Muslim feel more vulnerable. The Korea Times 
reported that “[i]n 2013, a Taliban operative who 
came to Korea under the guise of a migrant work-
er was deported for his role in organizing rallies 
against the United States and a war against the 
West.”69
Philippines
President Park Geun-hye, who was elected in De-
cember 2012, has pursued enhanced trade, aid, 
and security cooperation with the “VIP” coun-
tries: Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines. 
President Benigno Aquino of the Republic of Phil-
ippines (PR) was the first foreign head of state to 
visit the ROK in the first year of Park Geun -hye’s 
new presidency. On October 17, 2013, the first day 
of the visit, the two presidents signed three agree-
ments, including military sales to the Philippines, 
sports cooperation, and US$80 billion loan for a 
flood mitigation project in Pampanga province.70 
Jasmin Lee was commended “for her efforts in 
securing the approval of relief and rehabilitation 
assistance from the Republic of Korea for the vic-
tims of Typhoon Pablo in the Philippines.71
When President Aquino met with representatives 
of the 50,000-plus Filipino community in Korea 
on his second day of the state visit, he especial-
ly congratulated Jasmine Lee for “fostering warm 
and cordial bilateral relations between the Philip-
pines and the Republic of Korea, and promoting 
the rights of migrant women through her civil so-
ciety work and public service.” She was recognized 
for her leadership of the Filipino community in 
68 Young-won Kim, “Korean society struggles.”
69  Hyun-kyung Kang “Pakistanis in Korea Fear Backlash from IS,” The Korea Times, February 8, 2015, accessed February 22, 2015, http://www.
koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2015/02/176_173197.html.
70  Marlon Ramos, “PH, South Korea sign 3 agreements on 1st day of Aquino state visit,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 18, 2013, accessed 
August 25, 2014, http://globalnation.inquirer.net/88127/ph-south-korea-sign-3-agreements-on-1st-day-of-aquino-state-visit.
71  “Aquino confers ‘Order of Lakandula’ on 1st Filipino South Korean National Assembly member Jasmine Lee,” Presidential Communications Operations 
Office (PCOO), Republic of the Philippines, October 19, 2013, accessed February 15, 2014, http://www.pcoo.gov.ph/southkorea2013/news.htm.
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Korea and “for bringing pride to the Philippines 
through her election to the 19th National Assem-
bly, and becoming the first naturalized Korean to 
be a member of the Korean parliament.”72 The Phil-
ippines president conferred “the Order of Lakan-
dula with the rank of officer in recognition of her 
achievement and efforts to champion the cause of 
Filipinos and other foreigners living in South Ko-
rea” at a ceremony in Seoul.73 The accolade included 
recognition of her “role as a member of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, Trade and Unifica-
tion and the Committee on Gender Equality and 
Family of the National Assembly.”74 
President Park also praised Lee and introduced 
her at the state dinner as a human bridge between 
the two countries.75 She also expressed gladness 
that the peoples of the two countries can become 
part of the same family as well as close neigh-
bors, noting that the volume of people-to-peo-
ple exchanges surpassed 1.3 million and that the 
number of Filipino spouses married to Koreans 
reached 15,00076 last year.77 
Lee has assumed prominent positions in the Na-
tional Assembly and is recognized as a hardwork-
ing dedicated lawmaker.  She sees her primary 
mandates as representing immigrant families in 
Korea in the policy arena: “I was nominated to rep-
resent the growing number of immigrants in Ko-
rea, being their voice in policy making decisions as 
well as to be the link to help Korea in the transi-
tion to a multicultural society.” Her professed main 
goal is to design and implement a workable road-
map for multiculturalism in Korea by establishing 
a congressional department within the next ten 
years that can develop and oversee legal and policy 
changes toward multiculturalism.78 Additionally, 
Lee has a varied portfolio of interests. Rather than 
the single issue of multiculturalism, she extends her 
efforts to support Korean veterans of war as well as 
lawsuits filed by “comfort women.” She also works 
with other immigrants to help children of North 
Korean defectors.79  
Prior to Lee, another naturalized immigrant from 
the Philippines, Judith Hernandez, had run for 
73  Honors Code of the Philippines (Executive Order 236, 19 September 2003). In Section 5, II of the Honors Code, the following is provided as 
the criteria for the conferment of the Order of Lakandula: 
“The Order of Lakandula is conferred upon a Filipino or foreign citizen:
a. who has demonstrated by his life and deeds a dedication to the welfare of society;
b. whose life is worthy of emulation by the Filipino people;
c.  for deeds worthy of particular recognition, including suffering materially for the preservation and defense of the democratic way of life and 
of the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines, for devoting his life to the peaceful resolution of conflict, or for demonstrating 
an outstanding dedication to the fostering of mutual understanding, cultural exchange, justice and dignified relations among individuals; or
   d. for acts that have been traditionally recognized by the institution of presidential awards, including meritorious political and civic service.”
74 “Aquino confers,” Presidential Communications Operations Office. 
75  “President Park hosts State Dinner in honor of President Aquino in South Korea,” Office of the President of the Philippines, Republic of 
the Philippines, October 18, 2013, accessed March 22, 2014, http://president.gov.ph/news/president-park-hosts-state-dinner-in-honor-of-
president-aquino-in-south-korea/.
76  Separately, by the end of 2012, there were 9,334 marriage migrants and 5,481 naturalized spouses. By the end of 2013, close to when the 
summit took place, there were 10,039 marriage migrants and 5,912 naturalized spouses. See Republic of Korea’s Ministry of Interior annual 
reports on foreign residents at http://www.mogaha.go.kr/frt/bbs/type001/commonSelectBoardList.do?bbsId=BBSMSTR_000000000014.
77  Tack-whan Wi and Sojung Yoon, “Korea, Philippines move toward deeper cooperation,” KoreaNet, October 18, 2013, accessed March 21, 
2014, http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/Policies/view?articleId=113844. 
78  Jonathan M. Hicap, “Jasmine Lee: A Filipino in South Korea’s Assembly,” Manila Bulletin, May 10, 2014, accessed September 14, 2015, 
http://www.mb.com.ph/jasmine-lee-a-filipino-in-south-koreas-assembly/#lirp8eGdbg2BgoM3.99; Dohun Kim, “How Jasmine Lee, One 
Of The Most Hated Women In Korea, Is Changing The Country,” Huffington Post Korea, May 7, 2015, accessed July 10, 2015, http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/07/jasmine-lee-korea_n_7214186.html.
79  Sang-hwa Lee, “Jasmine Lee’s First Year as First Naturalized Korean Lawmaker,” Korea Focus, June 29, 2013, accessed July 10, 2014, http://
www.koreafocus.or.kr/design2/layout/content_print.asp?group_id=104903.
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the National Assembly in 2008.80 Both Hernandez 
and Lee were active leaders for migrants’ rights 
and welfare before entering politics. They earned 
the political and moral support of immigrant 
communities in Korea even though the women do 
not represent them officially by district or party. 
Migrant communities are becoming established 
as a de facto interest and identity group in Korean 
electoral politics, a trend that is likely to grow. 
The ROK and the PR enjoy strong and friendly re-
lations. Since 2006, Korea has been the number one 
source of tourists to the Philippines with about 1.2 
million a year.81 In 2014, a total of 1,175,472 Kore-
ans visited the Philippines, contributing to about 
a quarter of total tourist arrivals to the country, 
followed by the United States with 14.95 percent 
and Japan with 9.59 percent.82 As of July, 2015, the 
ROK was the fourth largest trading partner of the 
Philippines after the U.S., Japan, and China, and 
exports from the Philippines to Korea increased 
40 percent between 2009 and 2013. Both countries 
have been improving security ties as the territorial 
dispute between China and the Philippines over 
Scarborough Shoal has intensified. 
Closer government-to-government ties apply also 
to the education sector as the ministries of educa-
tion started in 2012 to exchange teachers between 
the two countries to educate students in both 
places about the history, language, civics, and social 
studies of each country. The teachers are expected 
to share best practices and help develop teaching 
materials on multiculturalism. Upon returning 
home, they are expected to raise cultural awareness 
of one another’s societies. The ROK Ministry of Ed-
ucation hosted the Asia-Pacific Teacher Exchange 
for Global Education program from September to 
November, 2014, when teachers from Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines were deployed to 
Korean schools. At the same time, twenty Koreans 
went to the Philippines and fifteen to Indonesia to 
teach in the respective country’s schools.83
In April, 2015, the government of the Philippines 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with 
Woongjin Foundation and its partner Digital Sky-
net Inc. to raise public awareness of Filipino mi-
grant issues and to promote Philippine culture to 
the broader South Korean public.84 The embassy 
staff participate as guests and provide information 
to the Filipino diaspora in Korea. Gennie Kim, a 
Filipina-Korean, works as the DJ for the signa-
ture program, Philippines Language Multicultur-
al Family Music Radio and manages a Facebook 
page with information on Korean immigration 
and citizenship policies, information on vocation-
al training, labor issues, multicultural civic orga-
nizations’ events, and other information.85 
80  “Caviteña vies for seat in South Korea parliament,” GMANews, March 28, 2008, accessed July 10, 2014, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/
story/86677/news/cavite-a-vies-for-seat-in-south-korea-parliament. 
81  Fernando T. Aldaba, “Enhancing the future of the Philippines-Republic of Korea economic relations,”BusinessMirror, July 2, 2015, accessed 
July 16, 2015, http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/enhancing-the-future-of-the-philippines-republic-of-korea-economic-relations/; Andrea 
Chloe Wong, “Prospects in Partnership: The Philippines and South Korea,” Philippine Foreign Service Institute, October 22, 2013, accessed July 
16, 2015, http://www.fsi.gov.ph/prospects-in-partnership-the-philippines-and-south-korea/.
82  Ted P. Torres, “2014 tourist arrivals up 3.25% to 4.8 M,” The Philippine Star, February 18, 2015, accessed July 16, 2015, http://www.philstar.
com/business/2015/02/18/1424847/2014-tourist-arrivals-3.25-4.8-m. 
83  Sojung Yoon, “Teacher exchange brings Asia closer together,” Korea.net, September 25, 2014, accessed July 14, 2015, http://www.korea.net/
NewsFocus/Policies/view?articleId=121877. 
84  “PH Embassy, multicultural radio in South Korea ink accord to push PHL issues,” Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, 
April 20, 2015, accessed July 18, 2015, http://www.gov.ph/2015/04/20/ph-embassy-multicultural-radio-in-south-korea-ink-accord-to-push-
phl-issues/.
85  “Multicultural Family Broadcast for Filipinos-DJ Gennie,” Public Facebook Page, accessed July 15, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/
Multicultural-Family-Broadcast-for-Filipinos-DJ-Gennie-587276964615980/timeline/; “Wendyflor.com Blog,” Public Facebook Page, accessed 
July 15, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/wendyflorblog?fref=nf.
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Vietnam
In contrast to the meteoric rise of Jasmin Lee, who 
has uplifted the spirits and status of the Filipino 
community in Korea, the violence against Viet-
namese women, which has been publicized by vari-
ous Korean, Vietnamese and regional media outlets 
and social network sites, became a sensitive foreign 
policy issue between the ROK and Vietnam. The 
Korea Times reported: “There is no doubt that the 
Vietnamese leadership is concerned about the al-
leged abuse of Vietnamese women by their Korean 
husbands. The Southeast Asian country has been 
hit by media reports that Vietnamese wives are 
the victims of various kinds of spousal abuse.”86 In 
2007, when Im Hong-jae, the newly appointed ROK 
ambassador to Vietnam, presented his credentials 
to the Vietnamese government, President Nguyen 
Minh Triet and other Hanoi officials requested that 
the ROK government better protect and improve 
the treatment of immigrant women from Vietnam. 
The president of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, an 
arm of the government and the Communist Party 
that oversees and conducts mass mobilization and 
encourages popular patriotism, urged Ambassador 
Im to “pay more attention to the Vietnamese immi-
grants so that they can better integrate into Korean 
society.”87 Vietnamese ambassadors to Korea also 
have raised the need for the ROK government to 
“regulate international marriage brokers by laws as 
well as government policies.”88
But positive diplomatic developments also are 
apparent. Even thorny issues dating back to the 
history of Koreans’ involvement in the Vietnam 
War have been kept at bay through the Vietnam-
ese government’s efforts not to politicize issues be-
tween the two countries. Despite the knowledge 
that some Korean soldiers in the Vietnam War 
were brutal fighters, inflicting harm on civilians 
as well as combatants, including rape (and the 
fathering and abandonment of children), neither 
the government nor the Vietnamese public have 
made such history political. 
In light of the new economic cooperation and 
people-to-people interactions with Korea, Hanoi 
emphasizes the present and future, rather than 
the past. On the 50th anniversary observation 
of the deployment of South Korean troops in the 
Vietnam War, Korean officials suggested that the 
focus of the ceremony be on multiculturalism 
and Lai Dai Han (a Vietnamese term for a mixed 
ancestry person born to a South Korean father 
and a Vietnamese mother including the victims 
of Korean soldiers during the Vietnam War), with 
a view to setting the stage for the two countries 
to get over their bloody past and move toward a 
bright future.89 The Vietnamese-Korean women 
and their Lai Dai Han children represent in body 
and symbolism a shared past and future between 
the two countries. 
In 2014, the ROK Ministry of Justice reported 
that 129,973 Vietnamese were living in South 
Korea, about 50,000 of whom are married to 
Koreans.90 Although there is no authoritative 
count of Lai Dai Han, they are estimated at be-
tween 1,500 by the ROK government and be-
tween 10,000-30,000 estimated by humanitarian 
86  “Abuse of Vietnamese Wives,” The Korea Times, November 2, 2007, accessed April 13, 2012, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/
opinon/2007/11/202_13039.html.
87  Ibid.; See also Vietnam Fatherland Front, “Law of the VietNam Fatherland Front,” http://www.mattran.org.vn/home/gioithieumt/luatmt/
lmttqvn1.htm.
88 Choong Soon Kim, 63.
89  “Vietnam Asks Korea to Cancel Vietnam War Celebrations,” KoreanBang, January 22, 2014, accessed March 2, 2014, http://www.koreabang.
com/2014/stories/vietnam-asks-korea-to-cancel-vietnam-war-celebrations.html. 
90  Dong-seok Sah, “In Korea, Vietnam War revisited quietly,” The Korea Times, July 3, 2015, accessed July 22, 2015, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/
www/news/nation/2015/07/618_182105.html.
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organizations working in Vietnam.91 Both the Lai 
Dai Han from the Vietnam War era and “New (新) 
Lai Dai Han,” mixed-Vietnamese-Korean children 
born after the two countries resumed economic 
engagement, are known to reside in South Korea, 
usually as undocumented migrants, but a reliable 
estimate is unavailable.”92
Vibrant trade, investment, and tourism between 
the two countries are evident. Since 2009, the dip-
lomatic relationship between the two countries 
has evolved from a comprehensive partnership 
to a strategic cooperative partnership. South Ko-
rea is the third largest trade partner for Vietnam, 
and Vietnam is Korea’s fourth largest export mar-
ket.93 An estimated 90,000 to 130,000 Koreans 
have been residing in Vietnam over recent years 
and engage in trade and investment activities. In 
2014, “Korea was the biggest foreign investor in 
Vietnam with $7.3 billion, ahead of Japan. Last 
year, their bilateral trade surpassed $30 billion for 
the first time, a surge of more than 60 times from 
the $490 million recorded in 1992 when they were 
just beginning to restore diplomatic ties. Trade is 
expected to grow even more with their free trade 
agreement [which was signed in May, 2015], ex-
pected to take effect by the end of the year.”94 
The ROK’s Korea Tourism Office opened its first 
office in Hanoi in August, 2013 to promote and 
manage the bilateral growth of people-to-people 
visits. It also created the “2013-Korea Tourism 
Year in Vietnam” campaign to promote two-
way trade and cultural exchange. In 2013, the 
number of Korean tourists to Vietnam ranked 
second (748,727) behind China (1,907,794) but 
ahead of Japan (604,050) and the United States 
(432,228).95 In the same year, the ROK loosened 
visa requirements for Vietnamese tourists. The 
growing Vietnamese penchant for South Korean 
products (from small appliances, garments, and 
cosmetics to food and machines) are facilitated 




China maintains a subtle interest in its citizens 
working and residing in South Korea. It is most 
sensitive to Korean policies that might disturb or 
threaten Chinese sovereignty. For example, when 
ethnic Koreans started arriving from China in the 
late 1980s, “the Korean state welcomed them and 
offered permanent residence and possibilities for 
citizenship for those descended from anti-Japa-
nese activists.” But because “Chinese leaders op-
posed what they saw as an affront to Chinese sov-
ereignty,” the policy was revised in 1990 to limit 
Chinese nationals to a three-month tourist visa.96 
Even after the two countries normalized diplo-
matic relations in August 1992, Beijing remained 
sensitive to the national identity and loyalty of its 
citizens abroad, which limited Seoul’s ability to 
91  Kang-pil Lee, “The Sorrow of a Neglected Bloodline, Lai Dai Han [버려진 핏줄 ‘라이 따이한’은 서럽다],” Donga , August 6, 1998, accessed 
September 14, 2015, http://www.donga.com/docs/magazine/news_plus/news145/np145ee050.html.
92  According to Kim Min Chul, an employee at the Migrant Network Television, there are “more than 10,000 Lai Dai Hans in Korea. This is 
because for the past 10 years, the government has been harshly searching for illegal Lai Dai Han immigrants.” See Dong Kyun Yu, “History 
Repeats Itself,” The Granite Tower, July 16, 2013, accessed July 23, 2015, http://www.thegranitetower.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=586. 
93  Vu Trong Khanh, “Vietnam, South Korea Complete Trade Pact,” Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2014, accessed September 
24, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/vietnam-south-korea-complete-trade-pact-1418272024; “Vietnam emerges as major 
export market for S. Korea,” Yonhap News, September 15, 2015, accessed September 24, 2015, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/
business/2015/09/15/0502000000AEN20150915002800320.html.
94 Dong-seok Sah, “In Korea, Vietnam.”
95  “International visitors to Vietnam in December and 12 months of 2013,” National Administration of Tourism, Ministry of Culture, Sports and 
Tourism, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, December 26, 2013, accessed April 22, 2014, http://www.vietnamtourism.com/en/index.php/news/
items/7592.
96 Seol and Skrentny, 153.
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advance the welfare of Chinese migrants and in-
tegrate them even slightly into the Korean labor 
force and society. Although the ROK legislature 
had intended to include joseonjok (ethnic Kore-
ans of Chinese nationality) in the Overseas Kore-
an Act of 1998, it refrained from any gesture that 
could be interpreted by China as “claiming” Chi-
nese citizens. Korean sociologist Dong-Hoon Seol 
and his coauthor emphasize the importance of 
the geopolitical and diplomatic context in which 
cross-border migration of co-ethnics occurs. They 
remark that South Korea “does not want to an-
ger China by luring Joseonjok away from China 
and thus challenging Chinese sovereignty.” They 
point out that although Japan has an ethnically 
tiered immigration policy, with descendants from 
Brazil and Peru (nikkeijin) placed at a low rung, 
the latter have “more freedom of movement than 
enjoyed by joseonjok from China because the two 
Latin American countries are not great powers 
with the proximity and economic and military ca-
pacity to influence Tokyo.97 Therefore, Japan does 
not have to be wary of slighting or offending Bra-
zil and Peru; by contrast, South Korea does have 
to be wary of China’s perceptions and reactions.
Chinese workers in Korea have been at the receiv-
ing end of many humiliations and mistreatment. 
But the Chinese government has tended to ignore 
or overlook the plight of their compatriots. Chi-
nese media coverage is sparse and vague on the 
plight of Chinese citizens in Korea. In 2014, China 
News carried an article citing information from 
Busan City Hall, mentioning that “despite th[e] 
large population [of migrant Chinese in Korea], 
there are inadequate resources, centers, and poli-
cies for when these foreign residents have issues. 
Often there arise problems and disputes due to 
a lack of infrastructure to support foreigners.”98 
Rather, Taiwanese and Hong Kong media have 
reported on the discrimination against and mis-
treatment of mainland Chinese living and work-
ing in Korea.99 
Chinese perceptions of gender roles in China and 
Korea color Chinese migrant wives’ experiences 
in South Korea. Women from China perceive Ko-
rea to be a place where women are treated poorly 
owing to “excesses of Korean patriarchy”100 com-
pared to men and women in China. They worry 
that highly rigid gender roles would force them to 
bear the burden of household chores, child-rear-
ing, looking after parents-in-law, and providing 
for ancestral rites.101 Joseonjok who visit their 
hometowns in China sometimes narrate stories 
about gender inequality and lack of freedom for 
women in Korea, which compound negative per-
ceptions of life in Korea. 
In this author’s view, Beijing would have good 
reason to address physical and social protections 
for its nationals working and living in the ROK, 
but it deliberately turns a blind eye because it does 
not want to raise attention to labor, political, and 
97 Ibid.
98  “Busan, South Korea number of foreign residents now over 50,000, disputes over inadequate infrastructure [韩国釜山外籍居民人数超5万 
基础设施不足纠纷多],” ChinaNews.com, February 17, 2014, accessed April 7, 2014, http://www.chinanews.com/hr/2014/02-17/5846964.
shtml. Translation by Audrey Wozniak, Wellesley College.
99  Ju-min Park, “S Korea snubbing badly needed immigration,” Taipei Times, December 8, 2013, accessed April 7, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.
com/News/biz/archives/2013/12/08/2003578520. Other accounts include the following: Problems of foreign brides in Korea in general, 
including China, with biggest obstacles being cultural and for rural Chinese women, the hardship of living in Seoul (http://www.china.com.
cn/overseas/txt/2007-06/13/content_8379746.htm); Online newspaper Dongbei Wang (Northeast [China] Online) reported that reports a 
story of a Chinese woman from the countryside tricked into marrying a Korean she thought was from the city, only to be stuck in Korean 
countryside with no escape (http://heilongjiang.dbw.cn/system/2013/05/12/054761383.shtml);  Online posting from a Chinese woman in 
Korea wanting a divorce because of her Korean husband’s excessive drinking, physical abuse (http://www.babytree.com/ask/detail/3345760).
100  Caren Freeman, Making and Faking Kinship: Marriage and Labor Migration between China and South Korea, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2011), 111.
101 Ibid, Ch.3. 
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human rights. It would be contradictory for Bei-
jing to protest the poor treatment of Chinese na-
tionals in Korea when the Chinese government 
keeps domestic demands for such rights at bay. 
Inter-Korean Relations:
Any process of peninsular unification must be 
based on the fact that South Korea is now a 
multi-ethnic and multi-national society whose 
democracy must expand and protect equal cit-
izenship and human rights for all New Koreans. 
Yet such a premise would face opposition from 
North Koreans, given the decades-long extreme 
ethnonationalism and xenophobia officially prop-
agated by Pyongyang. It is conceivable that race-
based conflicts might poison the inherently com-
plicated contestation over power and resources 
that any unification process would entail. 
North Koreans have criticized the South for per-
mitting the racial and ethnic mixing of Koreans 
through marriage migration. The Korea Workers 
Party newspaper Rodong Sinmun condemned the 
ROK’s turn toward a multicultural society as an 
“unpardonable crime” and “poison” against the 
Korean nation and the prospect of independent 
unification.102 DPRK delegation member Kim 
Young-chul told his counterpart at the 2006 in-
ter-Korean military talks that “the purity of the 
Korean people has been intact since the beginning 
of history” and that the South’s policies and prac-
tices were corrupting such purity. Kim declared 
that “not even a droplet of ink should be permit-
ted” to stain the river of the ethnic nation.103 
Christopher Hitchens recounted in Slate magazine 
the North Korean racism he encountered upon his 
visit to the DPRK, which included the condemna-
tion of South Korean society as a “mongrelized” 
society.104 Brian R. Myers, author of The Cleanest 
Race, argues that racist nationalism is the driving 
ideological force of the DPRK regime, abetting 
the “celebration of racial purity and homogeneity” 
that assumes moral superiority.105 Such xenopho-
bia and hostility to diversity of people, lifestyles, 
and ideas would certainly make unification dif-
ficult. For North Koreans, unification still means 
the ethnic nation; how they would deal with the 
different or mixed ethnicities of the South Korean 
society today is a big unknown. 
This author wrote in an earlier publication that the 
ROK government policy toward migrant work-
ers has been “held hostage by the yet unfinished 
nation-state -building project on the Korean pen-
insula.” Specifically, the possibility of opening up 
the north to South Korean-controlled manufac-
turing and services is an obstacle to creating regu-
larized (if not permanent) and predictable foreign 
labor practices. In 1996, around the time the ROK 
government was struggling to institutionalize and 
rationalize the first version of migrant worker 
policy, the Korea Labor Institute recommended 
that “Korea should not open its labour market 
on a large scale” in part because “in North Korea, 
about 50 per cent of the labour force is still em-
ployed in the agricultural sector” and “could be a 
major source of unskilled labour when Korean re-
unification occurs.”106 At the time, the Federation 
of Korean Industries and the Korea Federation of 
102  “The Idea of a Multinational, Multiracial Society Means Destruction of the Korean Nation [다민족,다인종사회론은 민족말살론],” Korea 
Central News Agency, April 27, 2006, accessed September 24, 2015, http://kcna.co.jp/item/2006/200604/news04/28.htm#7.
103  Won Joon Jang, “Multicultural Korea: South Korea’s changing national identity and the future of inter-Korea relations,” Stanford Journal of 
East Asian Affairs 10, no.2 (2015), 94.
104  Christopher Hitchens, “A Nation of Racist Dwarfs,” Slate, February 1, 2010, accessed May 12, 2015, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_
politics/fighting_words/2010/02/a_nation_of_racist_dwarfs.html.
105  B.R. Myers, “North Korea’s Race Problem,” Foreign Policy, February 11, 2010, accessed May 12, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/02/11/
north-koreas-race-problem/.
106  Katharine H.S. Moon, “Strangers in the Midst of Globalization: Migrant Workers and Korean Nationalism,” in Korea’s Globalization, ed. 
Samuel S. Kim (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 159. 
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Small Businesses concurred in their opposition to 
a worker permit system with the argument that it 
would jeopardize the ROK’s unification efforts to-
ward the North: “The employment permit system 
is expected to make it difficult for the government 
to send foreign workers back to their countries 
when there arises the need for Seoul to hire a 
massive number of North Koreans after Korean 
reunification.”107
The political acculturation and integration of New 
Koreans are critical to building national cohesion 
and identity, as well as to improving the newcom-
ers’ access to economic and social well-being. But 
their capacity for political participation in Korea’s 
democracy and the institutional and procedural 
capacity of the political system—government and 
civil society—to incorporate their interests and 
activities are underdeveloped. Expanding politi-
cal participation and institutionalizing norms of 
multiculturalism now are imperative. Doing so 
will help make democracy more robust for the fu-
ture when new challenges of political contestation 
and inclusion emanating from the process of uni-
fication arise. Otherwise, a disenfranchised and 
alienated immigrant population plus economical-
ly and politically dispossessed migrants from the 
DPRK will most likely destabilize democracy and 
fracture society severely. 
Immigrants and multicultural families provide 
South Korea with unique opportunities to expand 
and deepen democracy as well as foreign relations. 
Many seek inclusion and search for ways to contrib-
ute to South Korea’s security and prosperity. Private 
Jae-min Lebatard, aged 21, is a good example. Born 
in Cheongju to a Korean mother and a French fa-
ther, he became the first mixed-ethnic member of 
the ROK military to serve as a border guard at the 
DMZ in Paju in February, 2015. As a dual citizen, 
he could have given up his Korean citizenship to 
avoid military service, but he chose to be conscript-
ed “because he wanted to live as a ‘true’ Korean.”107
Implications for U.S. Policy
The United States has a stake in how well South Ko-
rea embraces sociocultural diversity and deepens its 
democracy, given that democratic values and institu-
tions are acknowledged by both countries’ leaders to 
be a common glue that helps bind the alliance. The 
health and robustness of democracy in South Korea, 
which has a close economic but guarded political re-
lationship with China, which tends to repress ethnic 
and religious minorities, are also important symbol-
ically and practically for the projection of U.S. lead-
ership in promoting and safeguarding democracies 
and cosmopolitan values. 
With regard to the U.S.-ROK alliance, there is the 
possibility that a demographically diverse but eth-
no-politically fragmented ROK can become un-
steady as a partner if national solidarity regarding 
the primary importance of the bilateral relation-
ship cannot be maintained over time. Might New 
Koreans, who do not share with the majority of 
South Koreans the history of the Korean War and 
the alliance, consider the U.S.-Korea relationship 
less or more of a priority in the future? How will 
Koreans of mixed ethnicity and cultural identity as 
they come of age in the next couple decades iden-
tify the national interests of the ROK? How should 
the United States and the ROK work together to 
encourage continued support of the alliance and 
other aspects of American-Korean relations as 
the demographic terrain of Korea changes? How 
107 Ibid., 160. 
107  Jae-won Kim, “French-Korean Soldier to Guard Border with North Korea, Korea Times,” The Korea Times, February 23, 2015, accessed May 
12, 2015, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/people/2015/02/178_173946.html.
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might the U.S. and the ROK share lessons about 
best practices and pitfalls regarding immigration 
and political integration of newcomers?
 
The Americans need to think ahead about how in-
ternal demographic changes in South Korea could 
affect the country’s foreign policy and security 
relationships and how Americans and other stake-
holders of democracy and tolerant multicultural-
ism might fashion policies toward the ROK that 
support political pluralism and further democrat-
ic consolidation, including public diplomacy and 
outreach to new leaders among the New Koreans. 
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